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Abstract 
The Homeland Security Act mandates development of a national, risk-based system to support 
planning for, response to and recovery from emergency situations involving large-scale toxic 
exposures.  To prepare for and manage consequences effectively, planners and responders need 
not only to identify zones of potentially elevated individual risk, but also to predict expected 
casualties.  Emergency response support systems now define “consequences” by mapping areas 
in which toxic chemical concentrations do or may exceed Acute Exposure Guideline Levels 
(AEGLs) or similar guidelines.  However, because AEGLs do not estimate expected risks, 
current unqualified claims that such maps support consequence management are misleading.  
Intentionally protective, AEGLs incorporate various safety/uncertainty factors depending on 
scope and quality of chemical-specific toxicity data.  Some of these factors are irrelevant, and 
others need to be modified, whenever resource constraints or exposure-scenario complexities 
require responders to make critical trade-off (triage) decisions in order to minimize expected 
casualties.  AEGL-exceedance zones cannot consistently be aggregated, compared, or used to 
calculate expected casualties, and so may seriously misguide emergency response triage 
decisions.  Methods and tools well established and readily available to support environmental 
health protection are not yet developed for chemically related environmental health triage.  
Effective triage decisions involving chemical risks require a new assessment approach that 
focuses on best estimates of likely casualties, rather than on upper plausible bounds of individual 
risk.  If risk-based consequence management is to become a reality, federal agencies tasked with 
supporting emergency response must actively coordinate to foster new methods that can support 
effective environmental health triage. 
 
Key words:  Chemical toxicity, decision making, Homeland security, risk management
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 Prevention and protection against environmental, occupational and food-related chemical 
hazards has been the primary goal of quantitative methods increasingly applied over the past 
thirty years to assess human health risks posed by environmental chemical contaminants.1-5  
Protective regulatory and industrial hygiene measures do not ordinarily require unbiased 
prediction of chemical risks or resulting casualties.  Extensive human pharmacokinetic, 
epidemiological and/or clinical-trial data—that have allowed reasonably accurate risk assessment 
for agents such as ionizing radiation and medical pharmaceuticals—simply do not exist for most 
toxic industrial chemicals and other chemical threat agents.  Consequently, assessments of 
environmental chemical risk generally entail substantial toxicity dose-response uncertainties, due 
to unavoidable reliance in many cases on quite limited laboratory animal data.  To address such 
uncertainties, health-protective assessment methods traditionally have involved routine 
application of “uncertainty” factors designed to guarantee acceptable levels of minimal risk.6  
However, a number of less biased approaches are preferable. 
 Best estimates of toxic chemical risks and casualties require unbiased characterization, 
rather than precautionary adjustments for, any and all underlying uncertainties.  An unbiased 
approach to chemical toxicity assessment is appropriate in a number of decision making 
contexts.  In judicial settings, for example, a fair and timely verdict must be reached in each case.  
In the U.S., reasonably fair assessments of environmental chemical harm, albeit approached 
through a deliberately adversarial process, are thus regularly attempted in civil “toxic tort” 
litigation, and at times also in criminal prosecutions.  In judicial settings, quantitative risk 
methods are increasingly employed by expert witnesses to help meet civil “more likely than not” 
or criminal “beyond a reasonable doubt” legal standards of evidence, constrained by the 
requirement to be persuasive to a lay jury.  Timely and unbiased assessment of chemical threats 
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and casualties can also be important for effective insurance and disaster planning.  In general, 
such unbiased assessment is needed whenever circumstances require choosing among, trading 
off or prioritizing options associated with different chemical risks or different combinations of 
chemical and other risks.7  This is perhaps most dramatically the case in urgent military or 
emergency response circumstances. 
 This paper focuses on the present need for more effective methods of timely and unbiased 
chemical risk assessment specifically to support domestic emergency response management.  
The need for assessment methods to support trade-off decisions, in addition to currently 
supported traditional protection-oriented decisions, is discussed in Section 1.  Section 2 discusses 
why current approaches fail to provide effective and timely support of trade-off decisions 
involving chemical risks.  The importance of bridging historically divergent professional 
perspectives to successful development and implementation of new methods to support 
environmental health triage when needed for domestic emergency response is discussed in 
Section 3.  Section 4 summarizes recent National Research Council (NRC) recommendations 
directed at the analogous problem of how best to support military coarse-of-action decisions that 
involve chemical risks.  A default approach to modeling integrated risk posed by dynamic 
respiratory exposure to one or more chemicals is outlined in Section 5.  Section 6 offers 
suggested steps toward an additional, unbiased framework for toxic chemical risk assessment to 
support more effective risk-based homeland security planning and consequence management. 
1. Risk-Based Emergency Response Should Support Both Protection and Triage 
 The Homeland Security Act of 2002 mandates the U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) to support research and development of technology and systems for “detecting, 
preventing, protecting against, and responding to terrorist attacks;” to help “ensure the 
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effectiveness of emergency response providers to terrorist attacks;” and to “reduce the loss of life 
... by leading and supporting a risk-based emergency management program ... of increased 
efficiencies, by coordinating efforts relating to mitigation, planning, response, and recovery.” 8  
In the rush to foster prevention, planning and emergency response systems for homeland 
defense, it is important to consider carefully how current methods used to assess impacts 
involving large-scale chemical dispersion are not risk-based, and how they may actually hinder 
risk-based strategies to minimize casualties. 
 Many systems in place or in development today link real-time plume modeling and mapping 
capabilities with a variety of toxic exposure guidelines.  Such systems can effectively support 
emergency planning and response for many large-scale toxic exposure scenarios, as well as 
facilitate training and design of prevention strategies.  However, such systems generally provide 
no systematically consistent way to compare risks that involve chemical exposures.  If planners 
and responders cannot reliably compare chemical risks, or compare chemical vs. non-chemical 
risks, then they cannot prevent or minimize associated casualties in a risk-based fashion.  
Reliable comparison of consequences associated with response alternatives will be critical 
whenever resource constraints or exposure-related complexities force a choice among possible 
options.  Under such conditions, current approaches do not permit risk-based choices, and so will 
inevitably produce ad hoc decisions that tend to allow preventable casualties. 
 A risk-based approach to trade-offs is possible only if responders use unbiased information 
on chemical toxicity to predict residual casualties associated with alternative response strategies.7  
Current protective guidelines for acute and chronic chemical exposures8-13 cannot serve this 
purpose because (as discussed in Section 2 below), they incorporate a number of “uncertainty” 
factors and conservative assumptions that may vary quite substantially in combined magnitude 
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from chemical to chemical, depending on scope and quality of available toxicity data.  Planning 
and response strategies that effectively prevent exceedance of such conservative guidelines will 
clearly achieve risk-based consequence management.  However, domestic terrorism events may 
involve either of two factors that complicate response and recovery decisions in ways that can 
make conservative chemical exposure guidelines irrelevant to effective consequence 
management.  First, widespread dispersal of hazardous materials may create exposure scenarios 
that are potentially complex, by involving multiple exposed populations, agents (chemical, 
perhaps also biological and/or radiological), contaminated media, exposure routes, exposure 
durations, and/or types of casualty (acute, chronic, quasi-threshold, stochastic, short-term, and/or 
long-term).  Second, logistic constraints, clustering of multiple events in time, and the sheer 
magnitude of damage incurred may limit response-and-recovery resources, either in the short 
term or for extended or indefinite periods. 
 Resource constraints and exposure-scenario complexities will, at times, make it impossible 
for planners and responders to operate within a traditional environmental health protection 
paradigm, which focuses on preventing the realization of conservatively estimated risks.  Instead, 
decision makers will be forced to operate within an environmental health triage paradigm, which 
focuses on making trade-off (triage) decisions that mitigate the greatest amount of expected 
casualty.  Because DHS is mandated to foster and use risk-based response methods8, these 
methods will thus need to address reasonably foreseeable triage goals.  While traditional 
protection decisions aim to avoid potential risks by preventing the exceedance of exposure 
guidelines, triage decisions aim to minimize the anticipated number of unavoidable casualties.  
Consequently, while effective protection decisions may err on the side of safety by factors that 
need not be consistent, effective triage decisions require unbiased casualty predictions. 
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2. Current Chemical Exposure Guidelines Cannot Support Triage Decisions 
 To facilitate risk-based decisions, planners and responders will ideally have real-time access 
to good data on a host of critical factors, such as estimated source terms, media-specific 
concentration gradients, geography, demography, climatology, hydrogeology, multiroute 
exposures, agent- and dose-specific toxicity, response/recovery costs and consequences.  Risk-
based environmental health triage decisions, in particular, require that planners and responders 
evaluate relevant data in a framework that allows them to compare the relative casualty-
reduction merit of alternative options, accounting also for any option-induced casualties.  
Relative merit will be assessed most conveniently using a unified measure, or set of severity-
level-specific measures, such as net cases averted, net cases averted per available dollar spent, 
net quality-adjusted years of life gained per dollar spent, etc.  The numerator of such a metric 
may, if desired, be raised to a power >1 in order to reflect risk aversion. 
 Defining a casualty metric, or set of metrics, useful for environmental health triage is not a 
trivial problem, and adopting any such definition is a risk-policy decision that should fairly 
reflect broad societal preferences and input.  Clearly, acute and severe casualties (such as deaths, 
or person-years lost) that are fairly straightforward to aggregate will tend to be a dominant 
concern.  But, for purposes that require comparisons, estimates for these endpoints may need to 
be aggregated with associated subacute and/or less severe injuries.  It may be difficult to agree 
on the relative importance of averting different types of injury, ranging from sub-lethal to lethal.  
Additional complicating factors—such as temperature dependence of severity for some types of 
injury, injurious or lethal secondary effects of certain casualty types or circumstances, and the 
relative value of averting acute vs. delayed injury or death, to name but a few—increase the 
difficulties likely to be involved in reaching consensus on rules and definitions to be used for 
8 
 
unavoidable environmental health triage.  However, the price of failing to adopt such rules and 
definitions will be to prevent risk-based emergency response, and so increase the likelihood of 
missed opportunities to prevent many unnecessary casualties.  The required rules and definitions 
need not have Talmudic complexity, when a simple approach may suffice as a reasonable basis 
to prevent gross errors in triage strategy. 
 Systems that integrate emergency response data with tools for analysis, visualization, GIS-
linked mapping and decision support have an increasingly pivotal role in consequence 
management and related planning.  Although some systems now in place or in development 
address a broad range of potential chemical exposures, these systems typically characterize 
“consequences” not by predicting casualties, but rather simply by predicting whether or not 
modeled concentrations happen to exceed Acute Exposure Guideline Levels (AEGLs)9, or sets of 
similar acute and/or corresponding chronic chemical exposure guidelines.10-13  AEGLs have been 
and continue to be developed by the National Advisory Committee (NAC) on Acute Exposure 
Guidelines Levels for Hazardous Substance, which has members from the U.S. EPA, the U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Department of Defense (DOD), the U.S. Department of 
Energy, the U.S. Department of Transportation, the National Institute of Occupational Safety and 
Health, and other federal and state agencies, industry, and academia.  Current support systems 
for emergency response routinely use chemical exposure guidelines, particularly AEGLs, in 
order to classify and display “risk envelopes” defined as chemical concentration contours that 
exceed or fall below specified exposure levels.9  In its operating procedures for AEGL 
development, the NAC makes clear that it specifically intended this type of AEGL application: 
 “It is anticipated that the AEGL values will be used for regulatory and 
nonregulatory purposes by U.S. federal and state agencies and possibly the 
international community in conjunction with chemical emergency response, 
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planning and prevention programs.  More specifically, the AEGL values will be 
used for conducting various risk assessments to aid in the development of 
emergency preparedness and prevention plans, as well as real-time emergency 
response actions, for accidental chemical releases at fixed facilities and from 
transport carriers.  The AEGL values, which represent defined toxic endpoints, 
are used in conjunction with various chemical release and dispersion models to 
determine geographical areas, or “vulnerable zones,” associated with accidental or 
terrorist releases of chemical substances.  By determining these geographical 
areas and the presence of human populations and facilities within those zones, the 
potential risks associated with accidental chemical releases can be estimated. ... 
By comparing the projected airborne chemical concentrations of the chemical 
substance in question with the exposed populations, human health risks associated 
with a chemical release can be estimated.  Using these risk estimates, emergency 
response personnel can make effective risk management and risk communication 
decisions to minimize the adverse impact of the release on human health.” 11 (pp.31-
32) 
Atmospheric dispersion modelers have widely adopted this NAC philosophy concerning utility 
of AEGLs for consequence management involving large-scale chemical exposures.  For 
example, modelers currently claim that AEGL-exceedance-zone maps can “be interpreted 
quickly by emergency managers in terms of expected toxic consequences”14 and “aid in 
determining health risks, recommending emergency actions (such as sheltering, evacuation, 
relocation, reentry), and deploying emergency personnel.”15  
 Clearly, such claims are valid only if exposure scenarios addressed are simple enough, and 
only if resources available for response and recovery are large enough, to obviate any need to 
make trade-offs or priorities.  As pointed out in the NRC report, Science and Judgment in Risk 
Assessment, when risk managers must make trade-offs and priorities, they ought to “take into 
account information on uncertainty in quantities being ranked so as to ensure that such trades do 
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not increase expected risk and such priorities are directed at minimizing expected risk.” 7  In 
contrast, AEGLs and similar chemical exposure guidelines for the general public “are not true 
effect levels,” insofar as they incorporate multiple “uncertainty” factors that are “designed to 
protect the general public, including susceptible subpopulations, from short-term exposures to 
acutely toxic chemicals.”11 (pp. 36, 63) 
 One such factor applied routinely to develop AEGLs and similar guidelines for chemical 
non-cancer risks, is the so-called “intraspecies uncertainty” factor sometimes denoted UFH (10 by 
default, unless data justify using 3 or 1).6,11,16  This factor is applied to account for the range of 
interindividual variability (i.e, heterogeneity or differences) in sensitivity or susceptibility to 
toxic response that is expected in a general human population.,11 (p. 80)  It reflects a default 
assumption concerning the typical ratio of chemical concentration eliciting a specified toxic 
endpoint in relatively susceptible individuals or subpopulations (e.g., due to age, health status, 
genetics, etc.), to that eliciting the same endpoint in average healthy humans.16  Susceptibility-
related variation addressed by UFH, concerning a chemical toxicity risk R relative to its 
population-average value 
† 
R , is completely irrelevant to estimating the expected value E(N) of 
the number N of casualties (i.e., “population risk”) for any exposed population, because by 
definition E(N) = N 
† 
R ; moreover, exact knowledge of a UFH-variability distribution is typically 
of little or no value because, if considered to be of interest, the corresponding N-uncertainty 
distribution is typically very well approximated as a Poisson-binomial function of 
† 
R  alone.17-19 
 In addition to safety/“uncertainty” factors, AEGLs for non-cancer endpoints incorporate two 
systematically “conservative” (health-protective) assumptions.  First, a conservative toxicity 
endpoint is used to estimate toxic response.  For example, subclinical endpoints are among those 
used to derive AEGL-2 guidelines, which are intended to prevent “irreversible or other serious 
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long-lasting health effects or an impaired ability to escape” 11 (p. 35); and lower-bound response 
endpoints—such as a lethal concentration (LC) to 1% or 5%, or an arbitrary fraction of the LC to 
50%, of exposed animals—are used to derive AEGL-3 guidelines (the most protective category 
of AEGL guidelines), which are intended to prevent “life-threatening health effects or death” in a 
general population including sensitive individuals. 11 (p. 35)  Second, by default when data are 
unavailable or inadequate, a conservative value is assumed for the exponent n used to extrapolate 
response vs. exposure duration from the generalized Haber’s law relation, Cnt = k (e.g., n = 3 is 
assumed to extrapolate from an observed longer to an estimated shorter exposure duration).11 (pp. 
103-110)  For carcinogens, AEGLs11 (pp. 116-121) “attempt to limit potential cancer risk to 10-4 or less” 
considering the “maximum risk to an infant” calculated by default using a linearized multistage 
risk-extrapolation model, which model is generally considered to reflect mechanistically health-
protective (conservative) assumptions concerning low-dose dose-response relations for many, if 
not most chemical carcinogens.20  
 For the specific purpose of protecting health by preventing any substantial occurrence of 
injuries or casualties, such conservative factors and assumptions used to derive AEGLs are 
explicit, intentional and entirely appropriate.  However, this conservatism will interfere if the 
goal is instead to compare or minimize casualties expected to arise from alternative chemical or 
mixed chemical/non-chemical exposure scenarios, unless both (1) expected chemical-specific 
casualties are in each case an approximately linear function of environmental concentration; and 
(2) there is near homogeneity among known, chemical-specific levels of aggregate “relative 
bias” (for each chemical defined as the product of relative biases due to each protective factor or 
assumption used).  Neither of these two exceptions would appear to apply for most chemicals 
and toxicity endpoints relevant to emergency response, because quite nonlinear dose-response 
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models (e.g., no-effect levels or log-probit models) tend to be used in this context10, and the 
magnitude of aggregate dose-response conservatism evidently varies quite substantially, and 
quite non-intuitively, from chemical to from chemical. 
 For each of ten toxic chemicals among 18 addressed in AEGL volumes 2-49 (volume 1 does 
not include 10-min AEGLs), Table 1 summarizes the aggregate relative bias created by 
uncertainty factors and conservative assumptions used to develop 10-min AEGL-3 guidelines, 
relative to an estimated concentration (LC50*) lethal to 50% of a population having typical 
susceptibility.  Methods used to calculate an approximate relative bias in 50% lethality (RBL = 
LC50*/[10-min AEGL-3]) are described in notes to this table.  Because AEGL-3 guidelines are 
intended to prevent acute lethal or life-threatening injury to nearly all members of a general 
population exposed for 10-min11, RBL values certainly reflect no intentional bias.  Rather, they 
represent only hypothetical bias that would be created only if 10-min AEGL-3 guidelines listed 
were misinterpreted as information that could be used to estimate either absolute or relative 
magnitudes of casualties to be expected from a 10-min exposure to the corresponding chemicals. 
[Note to editor:  Insert Table 1 about here.] 
 Table 1 makes two important points.  First, RBL values listed in Table 1 span a 200-fold 
range.  Second, the degree to which RBL values listed in Table 1 are all (as expected) 
substantially >1 depends entirely on specific attributes or deficiencies in animal toxicity data that 
happen to be available for each chemical.  Consequently, it would in general be impossible to 
estimate a specific LC50* value, let alone a corresponding number of casualties expected if 
specific populations are exposed dynamically to specific air concentrations over time, using 
information currently summarized by AEGLs or similar exposure guidelines.  The ability to 
obtain such estimates, particularly for use in emergency circumstances, requires that credible 
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methodology first be developed and applied in advance to re-analyze underlying toxicity data 
specifically for this purpose. 
 Due to systematic incorporation of protective bias, AEGLs are widely recognized to 
“provide no way to estimate expected health risks or the fraction of any exposed population that 
will actually experience symptoms.” 14  The conservative bias in AEGLs and most other chemical 
exposure guidelines contrasts with the intended predictive nature of analogous guidelines 
concerning exposures to ionizing radiation.  Chemical exposure guidelines typically incorporate 
multiple safety factors, while radiation protection guidelines tend to reflect “best” (unbiased) 
estimates of risk that are based primarily on models of human epidemiological data and so 
considered to have relatively little uncertainty.21-23  Unbiased estimates are also available and/or 
currently used to evaluate predictable risks of injury or death from non-exposure-related aspects 
of emergency response and recovery, such as evacuation, or economic dislocations caused by 
long-term mitigation costs.24-27 
 AEGL-derivation methods for chemical carcinogens recognize that because “public health 
and safety risks associated with evacuation and other response measures might pose greater risks 
of injury or perhaps death [and thus] AEGL values based on uncertain theoretical cancer risk 
estimates might lead to response measures that increase actual or total risk for the exposed 
population,” some “measure of population based risk” should be considered.11 (p. 116)  However, 
this caveat does not clearly explain how different (protective vs. triage) decision-making 
contexts in general ought to affect the application of cancer-specific AEGLs.  Nor do the 
methods specifically address how these different contexts should affect the nature of toxicity 
information and type of toxicity estimates used to make decisions.  As noted above, non-
uniformly protective bias in AEGLs makes them inappropriate to use for predicting casualties 
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(i.e., population risks) that can be compared meaningfully among different chemical and/or other 
sources of risk.  Thus, only in the case of chemical carcinogens does AEGL methodology discuss 
the problem of what measures of chemical risk are appropriate to use for trade-off decisions, and 
even this restricted discussion is flawed.  These problems are, of course, not unique to chemical 
carcinogens, but pertain to all toxic agents and toxicity endpoints. 
3. Integrating Two Paradigms Requires Bridging Two Professional Perspectives 
 Scientific and regulatory bodies have not clearly and consistently communicated the fact 
that effective environmental health protection requires toxicity characterizations different from 
those required for effective environmental health triage.  This is unfortunate, but understandable.    
Emergency and military medical personnel routinely grapple with the need to make tragic 
choices in the form of triage decisions, which attempt to minimize losses by efficiently allocating 
limited resources after assessing competing risks and benefits as accurately as feasible.  In 
contrast, those engaged in assessing and controlling chemical risks have been professionals 
primarily in the fields of occupational and public health, industrial hygiene, sanitary engineering, 
environmental and regulatory toxicology, and regulatory risk analysis.  These specialists 
typically have operated within an environmental health protection paradigm, involving 
dedication to promoting human health by limiting potentially harmful environmental exposures 
to toxic chemicals.  The historic emphasis of these fields has appropriately been on protection 
and prevention through exposure limitation, rather than on accurate prediction of adverse 
consequences.  Environmental health practitioners typically help generate or ensure compliance 
with protective exposure guidelines, and do not routinely make life-and-death triage decisions.  
Life-and-death triage decisions have played little or no role in the recent history of U.S. 
environmental health policy.  The recently recognized potential for homeland security situations 
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involving widespread dispersion of toxic agents has created a new need for effective 
environmental health triage.  Consequently, methods and resources—analogous to those well 
established and readily available to support occupational and environmental health protection—
do not yet exist specifically to support environmental health triage decisions that will need to be 
made in complex scenarios involving large-scale chemical exposures.  
 The Homeland Security Act now mandates a national capability to operate effectively in a 
new “environmental health triage paradigm” for consequence management.  The new paradigm 
will not replace the traditional protection paradigm, which remains appropriate whenever trade-
off or prioritization decisions can be avoided.  When such decisions cannot be avoided, the triage 
paradigm clearly requires a new general approach to chemical risk assessment.  To be effective, 
the appropriate approach for the new paradigm must facilitate timely casualty estimates that can 
be compared meaningfully, rather than on upper plausible bounds of individual risks that are the 
main focus of the traditional protection paradigm.  Those who can best contribute to developing 
the new approach happen to be those engaged in areas of environmental health protection.  They 
are the ones most knowledgeable about the variety of safety factors and conservative 
assumptions currently integrated into most chemical risk assessments and exposure guidelines.  
However, current legislative and policy frameworks in certain agencies may impede the 
important contribution these professionals can make in developing new chemical risk assessment 
methods and guidelines needed to support effective environmental health triage decisions.  
National leadership could help to bridge different agencies and professional perspectives that 
must work together to realize an effective system of risk-based consequence management.  The 
fact that triage and protection paradigms neither conflict with nor detract from one another, but 
rather clearly have the same objective to prevent unnecessary harm, will help build this bridge. 
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4. Chemical Risks to Deployed Military Personnel:  An Analogous Problem 
 Congressional concern about Gulf War troops’ toxic exposures led to a series of National 
Research Council (NRC) reports, advising DOD on how to develop effective procedures and 
policies for monitoring and managing health risks of acute or subchronic chemical exposures 
faced by military personnel during overseas deployment.  One NRC recommendation to DOD 
was that it adopt a risk assessment framework including separate decision making paradigms for 
environmental health triage vs. environmental health protection:28 (pp. 66-67; italics added) 
“… the establishment of ‘conservative’ estimates of dose-response relations, that 
is, those deigned to err on the side of safety when faced with uncertainty about 
how to project expected human responses from available data, might not be 
appropriate for certain military uses.  When risks cannot be avoided and decisions 
are made to accept some risks rather than others, or to bear some risk in 
furtherance of a more fundamental military objective, it is important to make 
these trade-off decisions with unbiased estimates of the impacts of various 
courses of action.  In other applications, such as the setting of health-protective 
exposure standards for application in less severe circumstances, conservative 
estimates might be much more acceptable.  … [Analyses should be] conducted 
and … results presented, so that different uses appropriate for different risk-
management settings can be made.” 
DOD developed and implemented not the recommended dual-paradigm framework, but a single 
set of “military exposure guidelines” (MEGs) to serve as a comprehensive approach to managing 
chemical risks to deployed military personnel.12  MEGs are modified versions of preexisting, 
protectively biased chemical exposure guidelines, with greatest weight given to AEGLs in the 
case of chemicals for which AEGLs are available.12  The modifications used do not include any 
(even context-dependent) reference to “best” estimates of likely casualties, only military-specific 
adjustments concerning exposure (e.g., water intake) and susceptibility (e.g., among relatively 
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healthy, but also some potentially pregnant, adults).12  The MEGs, and a system of corresponding 
qualitative risk-ranking procedures, together were developed explicitly to serve as a unified 
system with which DOD pursues two different requirements:  (1) force health protection, and (2) 
coarse-of-action (COA) decisions in support of specific (including non-combat) military 
missions.12 
 After careful review of DOD’s single-paradigm, MEG-based framework to manage 
chemical risks to deployed troops, the NRC recently recommended that DOD scrap this system 
in favor of a dual-paradigm framework.29  The newly proposed framework involves one set of 
methods and guidelines for making force health protection decisions, and a different set for 
making COA decisions.29  Noting that the MEG-based framework for chemical risks continues to 
be used in the field, the NRC specifically warned DOD that “Because [MEGs] are protective in 
nature, it is exceptionally difficult (if not impossible in some instances) to use them for direct 
comparisons with other operational threats.”29 (p. 83)  Although the NRC endorsed the application 
of MEGs specifically for force health protection (and recommended ways to improve MEGs for 
this purpose)29, it recommended that DOD develop entirely new Chemical Casualty Estimating 
Guidelines (CCEGs) specifically to support COA decisions, explaining that: 
“The goal of CCEGs is to provide risk estimates of impacts on troop strength, 
including consideration of individuals affected to different extents by ... exposure.   
CCEG values must be unbiased estimates of risk.  They should be predictive 
estimates of casualties and they should not incorporate margins of safety or 
adjustments for missing information except under unusual circumstances. ... As 
predictive values, the CCEGs should not include protection for civilian population 
sensitivities (e.g., pre-existing disease), which is typically achieved by applying 
an intraspecies UF [uncertainty factor].  When chemicals of interest have known 
susceptible populations, it might be necessary to formulate more reliable 
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estimates of the mean responses of the entire deployed population at risk if those 
susceptible groups were not represented appropriately in the key studies [used to 
derive guidelines for such chemicals].  ... CCEGs ... will be predicting casualties, 
not suggesting safe levels buffered for error ...” 29 (pp. 80-82) 
Being predictive rather than protective in design, the proposed CCEGs would be appropriate for 
helping to make trade-offs or set priorities concerning chemical risks, in relation to each other as 
well as additional operational threats. 
 The joint objectives of force health protection and effective COA decisions, which DOD 
seeks to address through a framework for the assessment and management of chemical risks to 
deployed personnel, are directly analogous to requirements for environmental health protection 
and for environmental health triage, respectively, in a domestic homeland-security context.  
Consequently, the key point of the recent NRC recommendation summarized above—that a 
fundamentally new, predictive methods and guidelines are needed to support triage decisions 
involving chemical risks—applies directly to the problem of how to implement effective, risk-
based planning and consequence management for homeland security situations that may involve 
widespread and/or complex chemical exposure scenarios. 
5. Assessing Risks from Exposure to Time-Varying Chemical Concentrations 
 For the purpose of implementing CCEGs, the approach NRC recommended is similar to that 
taken to develop AEGLs, except that each CCEG would incorporate adjustment (“uncertainty”) 
factors only insofar as they make casualty predictions more accurate.  CCEGs would thus 
summarize information needed to predict total casualties, rather than concentrations likely to 
prevent nearly all casualties.  For quantitative chemical risk assessment, the NRC recommended 
the log-probit dose-response model as a default approach to analyze available data on each 
toxicity endpoint of interest.29 (pp. 86-87)  By this model, the probability P of individual response, 
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conditional on exposure to concentration C for a specified duration To, may be expressed 
conveniently as 
 P  =  
† 
F z1- f
log(C /Co)
log(Co /Cf )
Ê 
Ë 
Á Á 
ˆ 
¯ 
˜ ˜ = F b log(C /Co)( )  , (1) 
where Co and Cf denote values of C at which 50% and 100f% responses, respectively, are 
estimated from the best available data (with 0<f<1), where b is defined implicitly, and where    
z1–f = F-1(1–f) in which F is the cumulative standard normal distribution function and F-1 its 
inverse.  Additional methods were described allowing quantitative aggregation of individual risk 
from multiple toxic agents acting by similar, or by independent, mechanisms of action.29 (Appendix E) 
 For practical application to decision making problems involving dynamic exposure to a 
chemical concentration C(t) as a function of time t (in either a military COA or a domestic triage 
context), Eq. (1) can be generalized to account for observed dependency of chemical potency on 
exposure duration T, assuming a log-probit-plane dose-response model 11,30-32 of the form 
 P  =  
† 
F a + blogC + d logT( )  . (2) 
Eq. (2) is equivalent to a generalized Haber’s law (Cn T = constant) relation in which the “toxic 
load exponent” of concentration C is defined as n = (b/d) = [log(To/Tf )]/[log(Co/Cf )], where Tf 
denotes the duration of exposure at concentration Co estimated to yield a 100f% response.  All 
three fitted parameters of Eq. (2) are readily available only for a few endpoints and chemicals, 
such as lethality for chlorine gas and a number of other respiratory toxicants.31,33-34  More often, 
related estimates may be reported in the form Co, Cf and Tf, conditional on To.  In either case, the 
corresponding probability of response at time t may be expressed conveniently as 
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 P(t)  =  
† 
F z1- f
log To
-1 [C(s) /Co]
n
0
tÚ ds( )
log(To /Tf )
Ê 
Ë 
Á 
Á 
ˆ 
¯ 
˜ 
˜ 
= F d log To
-1 [C(s) /Co]
n
0
tÚ ds( )( )   , (3) 
where n was defined above, d is defined implicitly, and a = –log(
† 
Co
b To
d) (see Eq. 2).  Risks from 
multiple sources of dynamic chemical exposure can be aggregated by combining Eq. (3) with 
methods like those discussed in the NRC report on chemical risks to deployed military 
personnel.29 (Appendix E)  Corresponding casualties and associated uncertainty can then be estimated 
using methods previously described.17-19 
6. Road to Risk-Based Planning and Consequence Management for Homeland Security 
 Protective chemical exposure guidelines appropriately incorporate substantial and widely 
varying degrees of conservatism, which depend on the nature of available dose-response data.  
Trade-off and priority-setting decisions require unbiased estimates of expected casualties.  Such 
best estimates are not readily available, in easily accessible form, for most of the wide array of 
chemicals of concern.  Consequently, no readily accessible, reliable basis for risk-based planning 
or consequence management is available for incidents that require comparing casualties from 
different chemical agents, or from mixtures of chemicals and other sources of risk (e.g., 
radiation, biological agents, or evacuation measures).  What is missing is a comprehensive 
database of unbiased estimates of chemical toxicity and associated uncertainty characterizations.  
Current systems intended to assist consequence management for chemical exposure scenarios 
generally are limited to mapping areas in which AEGLs or similar guidelines are exceeded.  This 
approach is flawed because the mapped “consequences” incorporate widely varying degrees of 
conservatism, including factors that are partly or totally irrelevant to predicting actual casualties.  
Moreover, current systems fail to account for likely chemical casualties in a way that integrates 
21 
 
over all potentially relevant media, exposure pathways, time horizons and toxic endpoints, to 
provide casualty measures useful for making trade-off decisions. 
 To address chemical emergency situations that require trade-off and prioritization decisions, 
a fundamentally new, general approach to assessing and managing chemical risks is needed.  The 
new approach must focus on expected casualties rather than “upper-bound” individual risks.  The 
NRC’s CCEG-based approach, and related quantitative methods discussed above, can serve as a 
starting point.  Additional quantitative methods to characterize chemical toxicity and related 
uncertainty may also be of help.e.g., 35-41  As recommended by the NRC29 (p. 81),  such a new 
approach should be developed through a process that involves scientific peer review.  Active and 
coordinated involvement by federal agencies tasked with supporting emergency response would 
also clearly contribute to progress toward new data structures and methods to support effective 
environmental health triage. 
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Table 1. Bias of 10-min AEGL-3 relative to “best” estimates of lethal exposure to ten toxic chemicals.a 
 
Toxicity study 
 
 
 
Compound 
 
 
AEGL 
vol. 
 
10-min 
AEGL-3 
(ppm) Endpoint 
Dura-
tion UFA UFH MF n 
Relative AEGL 
bias in estimated 
50% lethality, 
RBLb 
Chlorine gas 4 50 Rat NLC 1 h 3 3 1 2 3 ¥ 1 ¥ 1.5 ª  5 [10] 
Diborane 3 7.3 Mouse LC01 4 h 3 3 1 [1] 3 ¥ 3.3 ¥ 3.3 ª   30 
Hydrogen cyanide 2 27 Rat LC01 15 min 2c 3 1 2.6 6 ¥ 1 ¥ 1.4 ª 8 
Hydrogen fluoride 4 170 Rat LC05 10 min 3 3 1 [2] 3 ¥ 1 ¥ 2.2 ª 6 
Methyl isothiocyanate 3 1.2 Mouse pup NLC 6 hd 3 10 1 1 10 ¥ 1 ¥ 100 ª1000 
Phosgene 2 3.6 Rodent NLC 10 min 3 3 1 [1] 3 ¥ 1 ¥ 2.2 ª 6 
Propylene glycol dinitrate 2 16 Monkey NLC 6 h 3 3 1 [3] 10 ¥ 4.8 ¥ 1.3e ª 60 
Sulfur mustard 3 0.59 Mouse NLC 1 h 3 3 1 3 3 ¥ 1.8 ¥ 2 ª10 [20] 
Toluene 2,4- and 2,6- 
diisocyanate 4 0.65 
† 
1
3
Mouse LC50 4 h 3 3 1 [3] 3 ¥ 4.2 ¥ 3 ª 40 
VX (nerve agent) 3 0.0027 Rat LC01 10 min 3 10 3 [2] 30 ¥ 1 ¥ 1.6 ª  50 
a 10-min AEGL-3 (life-threatening or lethal) concentrations in air for 10 of 18 compounds covered in the indicated AEGL volume9 
among AEGL volumes 2-4.  LCP = concentration lethal to P% of exposed test animals; NLC = non-lethal concentration; UFT = 
“uncertainty” factor of type T, for T = A (interspecies extrapolation of toxicity from animals to humans) and T = H (human 
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interindividual variability in susceptibility); MF = modifying factor (e.g., for inadequate data); n = generalized Haber’s law 
extrapolation exponent, assuming Cn t = k at concentration C for duration t and a constant toxic load k.  By convention, UFT values 
listed as “3” actually denote 
† 
3 .  The value of n is listed in brackets if it was not used to extrapolate a 10-min AEGL-3 value, either 
because the endpoint used involved a 10-min exposure duration, or because AEGL methods11 do not allow endpoint data at 
exposures ≥4 h to be scaled to extrapolate 10-min effects (unless justified by empirical data, as was considered the case for methyl 
isothiocyanate), and instead define the 10-min AEGL-3 value more conservatively to be the same as that scaled to 30 min. 
b RBL = LC50*/(10-min AEGL-3) = approximate bias in estimated 50%-lethal concentration (LC50*, in ppm) relative to 10-min 
AEGL-3 (in ppm), rounded to one significant digit.  RBL values listed were each approximated as the indicated product, F¥N¥E, 
where:  F =  UFA¥UFH¥MF conditional on UFA = 1 if a primate endpoint was used (also in the case of hydrogen cyanide—see 
note c); N = (t0/[10 min])(1/n* – 1/n) where t0 = endpoint study duration in min, and n*  = 3/2 = the approximate geometric mean of 
the range of n values (0.8 to 3.5) for respiratory toxicants reported by ten Berge et al.31; and E = endpoint-extrapolation ratio = (LC50 
estimate cited in the corresponding AEGL documentation for the species/study used for the listed endpoint)/(endpoint-specific 
concentration cited in that documentation).  The value of E =1.6 implied for nerve agent VX is the 10-min LC50:LC01 ratio for nerve 
agent GB.9 (vol. 3, p. 250)  Bracketed RBL values shown for chlorine and sulfur mustard are each defined as the ratio (LC50 estimate cited 
in corresponding AEGL documentation derived specifically for humans based on review of available data)/(10-min AEGL-3 value). 
c Humans considered to be no more and likely less sensitive than rodents for this endpoint.9 (vol. 2, p. 253) 
d Repeated on four consecutive days. 
e The plausible lower bound of D = 1.3 for propylene glycol dinitrate used in this table reflects the unavailability of acute lethality 
studies for this compound at AEGL-related exposure durations.9 (vol. 2, p. 84) 
